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1 Introduction
Domestic firms respond to trade liberalization in a number of ways. As import tariffs
fall, some firms shrink and eventually exit their market altogether, whereas others adapt
and survive. Those who survive do so in several ways. Recent work has shown that
firms respond by increasing their innovation efforts (Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen,
2016; Teshima, 2010), by increasing the quality of their products (Khandelwal, 2010),
by refocusing their product scope on core competencies (Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano,
2013; Liu, 2010), or by decentralizing their management hierarchy (Bloom, Sadun and
Van Reenen, 2010).
In this paper we use UK firm-level data to focus on a new channel of adjustment to
changes in trade policy. Namely, we demonstrate a shift toward increased provision of
services in lieu of goods production. An initial look at the data suggests that this shift
was potentially significant. Between 1997 and 2007 UK manufacturing import tariffs
fell from an average of about 7 percent to about 3 percent, mostly as a consequence
of the implementation of the Uruguay Round.1 At the same time, UK manufacturing
experienced a shift toward services provision relative to goods production (Figure 1).
This relative decline in domestic goods production was accompanied by a leveling off of
domestic production in absolute terms and happened despite the fact that overall demand
for goods grew rapidly over the period.2 The reorientation toward services has also been
important for overall activity in the manufacturing sector. For instance, the growth in
services revenues within the manufacturing sector during this period contributed three
percentage points to the manufacturing share of total UK output.3 Thus, the long-running
relative decline of manufacturing has at least in part been slowed by manufacturing
becoming more services-oriented.
The shift into services production is also visible at the level of individual firms. Figure
2 plots the change in goods production versus the change in services provision for indi-
vidual firms over the period 1997-2007. The negative relationship is highly statistically
significant and suggests that the shift towards services took place at the level of individual
firms, and was not simply a consequence of the reallocation of output shares toward more
service-intensive firms or sectors.4 Considered in light of these trends, existing UK firms
seem to have been, on average, re-orienting production toward services.
1See Figure A3 in the Online Appendix, available at http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~asoderbe/Papers/BSW_Appendix.pdf
2The value of UK manufacturing output grew less than half a percent per year over the period while
total UK goods consumption nearly doubled. See ONS (2007a).
3Services produced by manufacturing firms count as manufacturing output in UK national accounts
statistics. If we remove the increase in such services sales between 1997 and 2007 from our data (described
in more detail below), we obtain a manufacturing share of 10 percent in 2007, instead of 13 percent if
services sales are included.
4The coefficient of the regression line in Figure 2 is -0.58 with a standard error of 0.02.
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In this paper we use firm-level data for the UK over the period 1997-2007 to further
explore the link between reductions in manufacturing import tariffs and the firm’s trade-
off between goods production and the provision of services. We find that lower tariffs are
associated with a shift to greater services provision relative to goods production. These
results are robust to controlling for changes in manufacturing export tariffs, changes in
services trade barriers, firm fixed effects and a number of time-varying firm-level covari-
ates, as well as industry-specific time trends. We also show that the relative increase in
services provision in response to lower manufacturing tariffs is driven by both an abso-
lute reduction in goods production and, in particular, an absolute increase in services
provision.
We discuss a number of potential mechanisms that could explain these results by
generating a link between services and goods production within the firm. One possibility
is that firms’ goods and services outputs may be subject to demand complementarities.
However, this possibility seems to be ruled out by the strong negative association between
manufacturing and service outputs within firms. It is also inconsistent with the positive
impact of lower goods tariffs on services, conditional on several possibly confounding
covariates. A second mechanism which is potentially more in line with the evidence is
the possibility that UK firms’ relative provision of services rose due to an increase in off-
shoring activity. In other words, UK firms might respond to goods trade liberalization by
moving their goods production overseas to foreign affiliates or arms length suppliers, while
intensifying their focus domestically on headquarter services. In our empirical analysis
we find that this channel was relatively unimportant. Third, firms may adjust to trade
liberalization by selling industry-specific expertise that they have accumulated over time
as goods producers, which they can subsequently sell in the form of services. Finally, we
also consider a more traditional Heckscher-Ohlin-type mechanism in which trade liber-
alization drives UK manufacturing firms towards specialization in skill-intensive services
production.
We attempt to distinguish between Heckscher-Ohlin mechanisms and an “expertise-
driven” increase in service provision by augmenting our regression specification with a
number of interaction terms. We interact import tariffs with traditional Heckscher-Ohlin
variables such as initial average wages (as a proxy for workers’ skills) and initial capital
intensity as well as with a proxy for a firm’s accumulated expertise (initial R&D stocks
normalized by firm sales).5 The empirical results suggest a prominent role for the R&D
proxy for expertise in facilitating the transition to more intensive services provision in
the face of goods market trade liberalization. In contrast, higher capital intensity and
5The use of the R&D stock as a measure of accumulated expertise has a long history beginning with
Griliches (1979).
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higher average wages are found to be relatively unimportant. These results are robust to
controlling for additional interaction terms such as firm productivity and initial service
intensity, which might be correlated with R&D intensity. We interpret these findings
as favoring an expertise-based mechanism although we acknowledge that they are also
consistent with a more sophisticated comparative advantage story in which UK firms’
comparative advantage is to be found in expertise-intensive (rather than skill- or capital-
intensive) production.
Our finding that the firm’s stock of accumulated expertise is important in promot-
ing production flexibility is consistent with a strand of the management literature. For
instance, Wiklund and Sheperd (2003) argue that “Knowledge about markets and technol-
ogy...potentially have strong performance implications because they increase the ability
to discover and exploit opportunities”. A somewhat smaller literature brings these ideas
closer to the context we explore here by documenting the “servitization” of manufactur-
ing. Neely, et al. (2011) document global trends in servitization, finding that around the
world approximately 30 percent of manufacturing firms with over 100 employees produce
services.6 In a review of this literature, Baines, et al. (2009) note that a particular focus
of the literature is on service provision as “an opportunity to differentiate from products
originating from lower cost economies”, which is in line with the question we address here.
In contrast to this line of research, we apply a formal econometric strategy to explore
a specific determinant of the shift to increased services provision by goods producers,
namely trade liberalization. We show that this determinant was quantitatively impor-
tant over our sample period, with the average tariff reduction leading to an approximate
50 percent rise in firms’ services-to-goods ratio, compared with firms that saw no tariff
reduction.
The paper follows a line of literature that explores the within-firm response to trade
and trade liberalization. Several papers document the role of trade in promoting firm
productivity growth (e.g., Pavcnik (2002), Bernard, et al. (2006a)) as well as innova-
tion and technology adoption (e.g., Bloom, et al. (2016), Lileeva and Trefler (2010),
or Bustos (2011)). Somewhat related to this paper, Bernard et al. (2006b) show that
U.S. manufacturing firms that are more exposed to import competition from low-wage
countries are more likely to switch their domestic industry. More closely related to this
paper, Bernard, et al. (2017) show that Danish manufacturing firms have been switching
industries, toward services, and furthermore that for a subset of these firms R&D plays
an important role in the transition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and provides additional
descriptive statistics documenting the nature of services activities carried out by UK
6See also Crozet and Milet (2016) who document the servitization of French manufacturing.
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manufacturing firms. Section 3 provides a discussion of the potential mechanisms at
work and Section 4 describes our research design and specifications. Section 5 presents
the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Data & Stylized Facts
Firm Data
The primary dataset used is the UK Annual Respondents Database (ARD), which con-
tains firm-level variables over the period 1997-2007.7 The ARD is drawn from an un-
derlying register of the (near) universe of UK businesses. The data consist of the full
population of large businesses (those with more than 100 or 250 employees depending on
the year) as well as a random sample of smaller businesses. Here we focus narrowly on
the manufacturing sector. Firms self-report their main industry of activity upon regis-
tration with Companies’ House, the UK agency responsible for incorporating companies
and maintaining a firm registry. Once registered, firms can (self-) report changes in their
industry classification although in practice this happens only rarely, even if a firm’s out-
put mix changes substantially.8 We include all firms in our sample that report that their
primary activity is in manufacturing in the first year they appear in the data, and we use
their industry code in that year to link in our trade barrier measures (see below).9
The ARD includes many establishment-level variables and, for our purposes, the most
relevant will be the total value of services provided by the establishment, the total value of
services exported by the establishment, and the total value of goods produced. Addition-
ally, the ARD allows us to construct the physical capital stock of each firm by applying
the perpetual inventory method to annual firm investments in plant and machinery. Our
labor productivity measure is also recorded in the ARD data as firm value added per
worker and the average firm wage is the wage bill per worker.
Additionally, we augment the ARD with the International Trade in Services Inquiry
(ITIS). The ITIS survey collects data on international transactions in services by private
sector companies resident in the UK, and is the main input into the trade in services
7For a comprehensive description of this dataset see Criscuolo, Haskel and Martin (2003) or for a
summary see Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011). We note that we begin our sample in 1997 because this is
the first year that the ARD contains information about firms’ services output.
8Less than 1 percent of the firms in the ARD report major changes in sectoral classification (switching
from manufacturing to services or vice-versa). As a result, around 5 percent of manufacturing firms
report more service than goods sales. This pattern seems to be even more pronounced in other countries.
For example, Crozet and Milet (2014) report that in 2007, 33 percent of French firms classified as
manufacturing firms were selling more services than goods.
9Our results are virtually identical if we also include the small number of firms that start in services
but transition into manufacturing (we use their first manufacturing industry code to link in the trade
barrier data in that case).
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account in the UK balance of payments (ONS, 2007b; Breinlich and Criscuolo, 2011).
The ITIS covers firms with ten or more employees and samples around 20,000 firms
per year (before 2001 this was 10,000), oversampling firms that are likely to be services
traders. In contrast to the ARD, the ITIS asks about the types of services exported or
imported, and the countries of destination or origin of exports and imports. The ITIS
distinguishes between 38 types of services (grouped into 10 aggregate categories) and
records trade with around 220 foreign countries and territories. We can use the ITIS to
obtain an outline of the service export activities of manufacturing firms. Table 1 lists the
types of services exported by UK manufacturing firms along with their prevalence in the
data. Notably, Royalties and Licenses and Technical Services are the two most common
services exports by manufacturing firms, followed with some distance by Agricultural,
Mining, and On-Site Processing Services, as well as Business and Professional Services.10
Finally, we combine the ARD data with information on the annual R&D investments
by firms, drawn from the Business Expenditure on Research and Development (BERD)
dataset. We construct the R&D stock for each firm using the perpetual inventory method
applied to the BERD flows, adopting an economic depreciation rate of 30 percent.11
Throughout, we normalize this measure by firm revenue in order to capture firm intensity
in R&D.12
Our final dataset contains up to 45,000 individual firms depending on the specification
(as noted in the regression tables), covering 225 manufacturing industries at the 4-digit
level of the UK Standard Industrial Classification (UK SIC) over the period 1997-2007.13
As noted, the sample of small firms in the ARD is a repeated cross-section, such that
small firms’ tenure in our dataset is variable and usually short.14 In addition, there is
quite a bit of churning of firms into and out of our sample though the extent of the
churning is stable across years. The most important reason for sample exit is the sample
design underlying the ARD, and in particular the random sampling of small and medium-
sized firms.15 Nevertheless, we discuss this issue further in our robustness checks and
10Note that the ARD only contains the total value of service production (i.e., not by service type), so
that we cannot provide a similar breakdown for overall service production.
11We choose this value following the convention in the literature – see, for instance, Bloom, Griffith
and Van Reenen (2002). However, our results are virtually unchanged for values near this.
12We scale the R&D stock by firm revenue in order to capture firm intensity in R&D. This is consistent
with the idea that even small firms who are relatively R&D active may apply their accumulated expertise
to services provision. Stated differently, we do not believe that firm size, and hence the absolute size of
the R&D stock, is necessarily the key determinant of the likelihood of transition.
13In specifications that include the R&D stock variable the number of firms is reduced due the smaller
sample of firms drawn for the BERD.
14Online Appendix Table A2 documents the number of firms in our dataset by tenure, where we see
that indeed the most common tenure is one year.
15See Partington (2001) for details. As discussed, larger firms are always sampled. Medium-sized
entreprises (between 10 and 100 to 250 employees) are rotated out of the sample at a rate of 50 percent
per year, meaning that half the businesses that are in the survey in year one are also included for year
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provide evidence that sample entry/exit is unlikely to be problematic for our results. For
example, we show that our results are almost identical across sub-samples that include
firms with relatively short or relatively long tenures in our dataset. We also present
results for attrition probability regressions which show that the probability of actual exit
(as opposed to exit from the sample) in response to tariff cuts is not higher for firms with
initially lower service shares.16
Trade Barrier Data
Import tariffs (τMjtG) for each industry and year in our sample are collected from the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Tariff Database. We focus on Most Favored Nation
(MFN) tariffs, which do not vary across WTO member countries. We aggregate tariff
line information to the 4-digit UK SIC level using concordances provided by the United
Nations Statistics Division and taking simple averages across tariff lines. Note that
changes in MFN tariffs were the most important source of variation during our sample
period in the European Union’s (EU) (and hence the UK’s) external tariff, in the sense
that they applied to imports from all other WTOmembers, covering almost all of the UK’s
imports from outside the EU. The EU also negotiated a number of free trade agreements
between 1997 and 2007 but these were with smaller trading partners which accounted
for only a small share of the UK’s non-EU trade.17 While average MFN import tariffs
were already relatively low in 1997 (around 5%), this average hides substantial sectoral
heterogeneity. In 1997, ad-valorem tariffs ranged from 0 percent to over 40 percent in
some sectors. By 2007, average tariff levels had halved to around 2.5 percent and the
highest tariffs to just over 20%, implying tariff reductions of up to 20 percentage points.
Our empirical strategy also requires average goods export tariffs (τXjtG) faced by UK
firms in foreign destinations. These come from the United Nations’ Trade Analysis and In-
formation System (TRAINS) as cleaned and expanded by Feenstra and Romalis (2014).18
two. Smaller businesses are usually only included for one year, meaning that the exit rate for such firms
is 100%. Using these re-sampling probabilities by size band together with the number of firms in each
band yields an average resampling-induced exit probability of around 45%. As a consistency check, we
have also computed an indicator for true firm exit (as opposed to exit from the ARD sample) using the
UK’s firm register (the BSD) from which the ARD sample is drawn. This shows that the average true
exit probability for the firms that appear in our sample at some point is indeed only around 4.5% per
year, again suggesting that only a small part of the sample exit rate of 49-51% reported in Table 2 is
due to true exit.
16In Online Appendix Table A3 we further document for each two-digit industry the average number
of firms and average industry sales over 1997-2007.
17See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/agreements/index_en.htm for a list of
EU trade agreements. Importantly, MFN tariffs applied to all of the UK’s major non-EU trading partners
such as the U.S., Japan and China. (China had been granted most-favored nation status by the EU in
1985, long before its eventual WTO accession in 2001.)
18We thank John Romalis for making these data available to us.
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We aggregate these product-destination-year specific tariffs in two steps. First, using a
concordance between SITC and UK SIC provided by the United Nations Statistics Divi-
sion, we construct destination-specific export tariffs at the UK SIC 4-digit level by taking
simple averages across the SITC tariff lines mapping into a given UK SIC code. We
then aggregate across destination countries using average trade shares of each destina-
tion country in total UK exports between 1994-1996. The resulting average ad valorem
tariff varies at the year and 4-digit SIC-level, and captures the average goods export
barriers faced by UK manufacturing firms in a given industry and year.19
In one of our robustness checks we also control for intermediate input tariffs for goods
which we compute as the weighted average of the UK import tariffs of all industries k
supplying a given industry j:
Input tariffjt =
∑
k
wkj × τMktG
where τMktG is industry k’s goods import tariff (described above) and wkj is the cost share
of industry k in the production of goods in industry j in 1995. We obtain information on
wkj from the UK’s input-output table for 1995 (ONS, 2002).
For measures of services trade barriers (τMjtS and τXjtS) we rely on the OECD’s Product
Market Regulation (PMR) index which quantifies barriers to services trade in different
service types for OECD and selected third countries.20Unfortunately, there is no existing
concordance between these service types and UK SIC industries. Thus, in a first step we
need to determine the service types that correspond to each SIC industry. To do this,
we focus on the service types that are imported and exported by firms in a particular
SIC industry, obtained from the UK ITIS. For imports, we compute the share of each
service type imported by the firms in a given sector in the total service imports of these
firms. We then use these shares as weights to aggregate the service-type specific trade
barriers from the PMR to obtain UK SIC-specific import barriers.21 For exports, we first
compute service-type weights in a similar manner and calculate destination-industry-
specific export barriers by combining the weights and the service-specific barriers for
each foreign country reported by the OECD PMR index. Similar to goods export tariffs,
in a final step we aggregate across all foreign countries using the share of each country in
19We use simple averages or pre-period weights to avoid or reduce endogeneity problems arising from
the use of contemporary trade weights (that are themselves a function of tariffs).
20These data are available at www.oecd.org/economy/growth/.
21We use the first year in our sample (1997) to construct these weights in order to reduce endogeneity
problems. Unfortunately, no firm-level service import data is available prior to 1997 so that we cannot
use pre-sample weights as for our goods export tariffs. Note that constructing weights at the industry
rather than the firm level helps reducing endogeneity problems from using trade-based weights. We also
experimented with using simple averages across all service types imported by firms in a given sector,
with similar results.
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total UK services exports between 1994-1996.
Note that for most of our analysis, our focus will be on the effect of import tariffs on
the relative mix of service and goods production, controlling for the other trade barriers
just discussed. Tariffs have a number of important advantages over other measures of
the intensity of import competition. Most importantly, they are under the direct control
of policy makers, rather than being determined by a complex array of additional general
equilibrium forces, as is the case for import penetration ratios. As such, understanding
the impact of tariff changes on service intensity is of much more direct policy relevance.22
Second, tariffs are arguably more exogeneous than general equilibrium outcomes such
as imports. This is particularly true in our setting, given that both manufacturing import
and export tariffs are negotiated by the European Commission for the European Union as
a whole, making them less likely to be endogenous to UK industrial trends. Also note that
in contrast to regional trade agreements, MFN tariff changes are the result of multilateral
negotiations involving a large number of countries, making it more difficult for individual
firms or sectors to influence their outcome. Indeed, this is another important reason for
why we focus on MFN tariffs. Services trade barriers are more heterogeneous and still
more influenced by national policies. But even here, bilateral negotiations with other
countries and trading blocks fell within the remit of the European Commission for the
second half of our sample period, and services barriers were brought into the remit of the
World Trade Organization as part of the Uruguay Round.23 We return to this issue in
Section 4 below where we report additional econometric evidence for the exogeneity of
tariff reductions and discuss potential remaining issues. In Section 5, we also show that
our results are robust to using (likely endogenous) import penetration ratios instead of
import tariffs.
Stylized Facts
This section presents basic descriptive statistics on the provision of services by UK man-
ufacturing firms. To begin, we restate two findings presented in the introduction. Figure
1 documents the share of services revenues in total revenues across all UK firms between
1997 and 2007. We see that since 1997 the fraction of service activity within manufactur-
22See for instance Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) and Trefler (2004) for a discussion of this point and a
criticism of more indirect measures such as import penetration ratios. In any case, below we demonstrate
that regressing service shares on import penentration ratios instead of import tariff yields qualitatively
similar results.
23The European Commission obtained explicit powers to negotiate services trade policy in addition
to goods trade policy in the Treaty of Nice (2001). Trade policy in services is restricted by the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of 1995, although it is still unclear to what extent the Uruguay
Round triggered a liberalization of services trade in addition to goods trade (see Francois and Hoekman,
2010).
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ing firms has grown steadily, reaching 20 percent in 2007. Figure 2 then plots the average
annual change in services revenue over the period against the change in goods revenue
for each firm in the sample. The fitted line indicates that, on average, goods and services
are substitutes within the firm.24
Focusing in more detail on the evolution of services provision within UK firms, Table
3 provides further information on the evolution of manufacturing firms’ services shares
and a number of firm-level covariates (average wages, capital and R&D stocks and total
revenues). Specifically, we regress the annual percentage-point change in the share of
services in total output (i.e., sharet − sharet−1) on firm-level variables measured at the
beginning of the period (i.e., at t−1). As seen, higher initial wages, R&D stocks and total
output are associated with a stronger shift into services, whereas the initial capital stock
is negatively (though insignificantly) correlated with the change in the services share.
Interestingly, when we include all four determinants jointly, only the coefficient on initial
R&D stocks remains positive and significant.
3 Mechanisms
Here we highlight potential theoretical channels through which trade liberalization may
affect relative goods output and services provision at the level of the firm over time. First,
it may simply be the case that a firm’s goods and services outputs are complements on
the demand side. For example, a firm may produce a product that requires some level of
ongoing support, such as a manufacturer who provides regular service on their product for
some period after purchase. In this case we would observe a strong, positive relationship
between the level of goods and services output at the firm level, and a simultaneous
reduction in both output types in the face of trade liberalization. However, in light of the
fact that we find a strong, negative correlation between goods and services production
within firms, we rule this out as a potential explanation for our results.
We focus instead on three alternative channels. First, a Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism
– in which increased global engagement by low-skill abundant developing countries al-
ters global production patterns – may have impacted the relative provision of services
across UK firms. More specifically, from the UK perspective increased firm specialization
according to comparative advantage would lead to a shift toward greater skill-intensive
production, particularly within industries that are overall skill-intensive (see Crozet and
Trionfetti, 2013, for a model of firm-level comparative advantage).25 Since many UK
24The coefficient of the regression line in Figure 2 is -0.58 with a standard error of 0.02.
25Crozet and Trionfetti (2013) show that firms that are intensive in the factor used intensively in their
industry and of which their country is relatively well endowed have a comparative advantage over firms
with identical factor intensity in other countries.
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manufacturing industries are likely to be relatively skill-intensive, this comparative ad-
vantage mechanism may manifest as an on-average firm-level shift toward increased use
of skill, which may correlate with an increase in relative services provision to the extent
that services are skill-intensive. We return to this prediction in Section 5.
Second, import competition in the goods market may lead to increased offshoring of
goods production by UK firms. There is, of course, a large literature exploring the decision
by multinational firms to increasingly locate headquarters services in human-capital-
rich developed countries while offshoring low-skill-intensive aspects of the production
process to developing countries.26 By focusing narrowly on a firm’s activities within a
single country (as we do) one may mistakenly attribute increased offshoring to an overall
decline in goods production by firms. This may lead to an observed relative rise in the
services share for all firms, and particularly for initially low-skill intensive firms who have
the greatest incentive to engage in offshoring (see Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008
or Wright, 2014). With respect to this potential channel, we can test directly for an
offshoring response to trade liberalization, and we do so in Section 5.
Finally, a shift toward increased relative provision of services may reflect a shift to-
ward sales of accumulated expertise by UK firms. In other words, over time firms may
accumulate industry- and product-specific expertise as a byproduct of their research,
development and production of goods, and this expertise may be embodied by workers
within the firm. When confronted with increased competition in the goods market, firms
may then leverage this knowledge in the market for services. In effect, the firms can sell
their accumulated market-specific expertise in lieu of goods. However, since the knowl-
edge is embodied, the switch to services will come at the expense of goods production.
One version of this mechanism is explored by Bloom et al. (2012). In their “trapped
factors” model the opportunity cost of producing services (in their case the focus is on
the opportunity cost of innovation, but the model’s mechanism is not specific to this case)
falls in the face of increased import competition in goods due to the fact that there are
adjustment costs associated with moving factors out of one output type and into another.
Alternatively, in the Online Appendix we present a similar model in which firm-specific
expertise is rival in its use across output types (goods or services) but where larger stocks
of expertise reduce the magnitude of the rivalry, thereby making it easier for the firm to
transition out of one output type and into another. In both cases it is an increase in the
relative profitability of services due to a rise in import competition in the goods market
that induces the transition. In this case there are two primary empirical predictions that
would be observable in our data. First, the switch to services provision may again be
relatively pronounced among low-skill intensive firms as skilled workers are brought on-
26See Crinò (2009) for a review of this literature.
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board to a greater extent among these most-affected firms, a prediction that is difficult to
distinguish from the more straightforward Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism described above.
However, a second prediction is that the shift toward increased services provision should
be greater within firms that ex ante perform more R&D (a proxy for expertise), and we
explicitly test this hypothesis in Section 5.
In sum, each of these channels may lead to a within-firm shift toward a more-skilled
workforce, which we will proxy with the firm’s average wage.27 However, beyond this, the
second channel predicts an increase in offshoring. To explore this channel we focus on
the fact that offshoring is typically associated with an increase in exports of headquarters
services, which we can observe. Finally, the third channel predicts a rise in R&D intensity
within the firm, and we explore this channel by exploiting available R&D data. We keep
these implications in mind and refer back to them in the empirics.
4 Empirical Approach
In this section we explore the magnitude of the within-firm response to trade liberaliza-
tion. Specifically, we estimate specifications relating the ratio of a firm’s revenues from
services relative to goods (RijtS/RijtG) to reductions in MFN import tariffs. We also
include a number of additional firm- and sector-level controls to further reduce the threat
of omitted variable bias and to increase the precision of our estimates. At the sectoral
level, we control for variation in the other three trade barriers affecting UK firms – i.e.,
UK import and export barriers for services trade as well as the export tariffs faced by
goods producers. Variation in any of these trade barriers will clearly have a direct impact
on the optimal choice of production of goods relative to services and we therefore want
to control for these potential determinants of relative output. At the level of individual
firms, we control for the average wage bill, as a proxy for input prices and the skill level of
the work force, and labor productivity, as a proxy for firm-specific productivity shocks.28
In addition, we include year fixed effects, which will capture any macro-level trends in
input prices and technologies; and in our preferred specifications we add firm fixed effects
and two-digit industry time trends to control for firm-specific time-invariant factors and
productivity trends as well as trends in aggregate expenditure on each industry’s output.
Finally, we note that our baseline specification, while formally atheoretical, is consis-
tent with the equilibrium ratio of services to goods output implied by a straightforward
monopolistic competition model, an example of which we present in the Online Appendix.
27Unfortunately, the ARD does not contain information on skill levels, so we cannot use a more direct
proxy.
28We acknowledge that wages and productivity are potentially endogenous. As we show below, ex-
cluding them does not affect our results.
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These considerations lead us to the following reduced-form specification relating the
ratio of a firm’s revenues from services relative to goods (RijtS/RijtG) to the channels
discussed above:
RijtS
RijtG
= exp
[
ηi + θt + β1τ
M
jtG + β2τ
X
jtG + β3τ
M
jtS + β4τ
X
jtS + β5 ln w¯ijt + β6 lnψijt + ρmt
]
+ ijt (1)
where the τ ’s represent import (M) and export (X) barriers for goods (G) and services
(S) associated with firm i’s industry j. Firm and year fixed effects are denoted by ηi and
θt, respectively. The firm’s average wage and labor productivity are w¯ijt and ψijt, and
ρmt is a 2-digit industry time trend. The main coefficient of interest is on goods import
tariffs, β1, since its sign indicates whether firms react to tariff reductions by increasing
services output relative to goods output (β1 < 0) or by reducing it (β1 > 0). While our
main interest is in the output of services relative to goods, we also estimate versions of
(1) in which we use goods or services revenues separately as the dependent variable. This
allows us to evaluate whether changes in relative revenues are driven by goods, services,
or both.29
We have chosen an exponential conditional mean function for our baseline specifica-
tions, which we estimate via Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) techniques.
The use of PPML estimation is motivated by two specific features of our data. First,
there are many zeros for the value of services revenue – i.e., the majority of firms in
our data do not provide services.30 A log-linear specification would thus need to drop a
large part of the sample. Second, given the highly skewed distribution of revenues across
firms it is unlikely that the unexplained variation in (1), or its counterparts with goods
and services revenues only, will be homoskedastic. As Santos-Silva and Tenreyo, 2006
point out, the log of the error term will then be correlated with the regressors, due to
the mechanical correlation between the mean and variance of a logged variable. PPML
estimation addresses both of these issues and, importantly, seems to be a superior estima-
tor relative to alternatives such as Tobit or Gamma PML (see Santos-Silva and Tenreyo,
2006, or Head and Mayer, 2013).31 Throughout, we cluster standard errors at the 4-digit
29Note that we use contemporaneous variation in tariffs rather than lags or leads. On the one hand,
it may take time to expand services production relative to good production. On the other hand, the
tariff reductions agreed to in the Uruguay round were phased in over several years and the reduction
schedule was widely publicized. Thus, UK firms would have been aware of the timing of tariff cuts and
might have started the shift into services production before the actual reductions took place. Using
contemporaneous variation strikes a balance between these opposing arguments and also maximizes our
sample size.
30In our baseline specification (see Table 4 below), 70 percent of firm-year observations for service
revenues and the ratio of services to goods revenues are zero.
31Note that the coefficient on goods tariffs (β1) measures a semi-elasticity as can be verified by dif-
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industry level because our regressor of interest (τMjtG) only varies by 4-digit industry and
year.
In an additional set of specifications we interact a number of firm-level variables with
goods import tariffs in order to explore the underlying features that are predictive of a
successful transition toward greater relative provision of services in the face of trade liber-
alization. This will also be helpful in discriminating between the remaining mechanisms
discussed in Section 3 (Heckscher-Ohlin versus accumulated expertise). Specifically, we
look at the role of firm intensity in skill, firm intensity in capital, and the firm’s accumu-
lated expertise. To do this we proxy the average skill level of the firm with the average
firm wage in the first year we observe a firm in our data.32 We also exploit data on the
firm’s initial period capital stock and the firm’s initial R&D stock (both normalized by
total firm revenues) in order to proxy for capital intensity and firm expertise, respectively.
We focus on these time-invariant measures in order to mitigate the potential endogeneity
between our dependent variable and each of these variables over the period. Finally, we
add terms that interact the firm’s initial labor productivity and initial level of services
provision with goods tariffs, since these may be correlated with a firm’s overall capacity
to provide services.33 Formally, we estimate versions of the following specification:34
RijtS
RijtG
= exp
[
ηi + θt + α1(lnR&Dij × τMjtG) + α2(lnCapij × τMjtG) + α3(lnψij × τMjtG)
+α4(ln w¯ij × τMjtG) + α5(ln InitServij × τMjtG) + α6τMjtG + α7τXjtG + α8τMjtS + α9τXjtS
+α10 ln w¯ijt + α11 lnψijt + ρmt
]
+ εijt (2)
where R&Dij and Capij denote a firm’s initial R&D and capital stock, ψij and w¯ij
its initial productivity and average wage, and InitServij its initial service share. All
remaining regressors are as in specification (1). We are particularly interested in the
interaction term coefficients α1, α2, α3, α4 and α5.
ferentiating (1) with respect to τMjtG. The corresponding OLS specification (which would produce biased
estimates) would be a regression of the log of RijtS/RijtG on the tariff variable. As a simple illustrative
exercise to show that log (RijtS/RijtG) is not dominated by outliers, we plot its distribution in the Online
Appendix, Figure A1, though again we note that taking the log leads to a large amount of zeros being
dropped.
32Unfortunately, the ARD does not contain information on more direct proxies for skill intensity, such
as education levels or the share of white-collar workers.
33Labor productivity might play a role if the transition into services production requires a fixed cost
investment. This investment would only be profitable for more productive firms and we should observe
a stronger shift into services for such firms in response to the tariff reductions.
34Note that the main effects of the initial firm-specific variables are subsumed in the firm fixed effects.
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5 Empirical Results
In this section we present our empirical results. We first show that lower manufacturing
import tariffs were associated with increased services provision relative to goods produc-
tion on average. We then explore the robustness of our results and analyze the firm
characteristics that influence the extent of the transition into services.
Firm Response to Trade Liberalization
Baseline Results
Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (1). In column (1), we include only
the import barriers for goods and services as well as year fixed effects. Columns (2)-(7)
add additional regressors and fixed effects which progressively make the specifications
more restrictive. In column (2), we add export barriers for goods and services, column
(3) adds firm-level wages and labor productivity and in column (4) we control for 4-digit
industry fixed effects. Finally, columns (5)-(7) add firm fixed effects, where columns (5)
and (6) compare the estimates with and without the potentially endogenous firm average
wage and productivity controls, while column (7) adds two-digit industry time trends.
Throughout Table 4, the coefficient on our main variable of interest (manufacturing
import tariffs) is negative and highly statistically significant, indicating that lower im-
port tariffs are associated with higher services revenues relative to goods revenues. This
suggests that, at least on average, firms shift toward increased provision of services in
the face of falling import barriers. We further note that the inclusion or exclusion of (po-
tentially endogenous) wage and productivity controls has little effect on the estimates.
Finally, controlling for industry or firm fixed effects leads to a steep fall in the coefficient
on goods tariffs, suggesting that there is a significant amount of unobserved heterogeneity
across firms and industries that is correlated with tariff reductions. The fact that coeffi-
cient estimates also change (albeit less) when industry fixed effects are replaced with firm
fixed effects further implies that unobserved within-industry heterogeneity might also be
a problem. By contrast, including industry-time trends leaves coefficient estimates ba-
sically unchanged. We thus consider our firm fixed effects regressions (with or without
industry-time trends) to be the most reliable specifications and focus on them for most
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of the subsequent discussion and results.35,36
We next explore whether the shift to greater relative services provision is due to
higher services revenues, lower goods revenues or a combination of both. Tables 5 and
6 are similar to those in Table 4, but replace relative revenues by services and goods
revenues, respectively. We see that lower manufacturing import tariffs led to both higher
services revenues and lower goods revenues.37 The results are most significant for services
revenues, where we find a negative and highly significant coefficient on goods import tariffs
in all but column (4). For goods, the results are slightly less robust, but the relevant
coefficient is also either positive and significant or insignificant, indicating that lower
manufacturing import tariffs did decrease goods revenues, or at least did not increase
them.
Economic Significance
We now look more closely at the economic significance of our baseline estimation. A
first approach is to compare the magnitudes implied by our coefficient estimates to the
actual shift into services observed during our sample period. According to our preferred
specifications (columns 5-7 in Table 4), a one percentage point reduction in goods import
tariffs led to an approximate increase of 18-22 percent in the ratio of services to goods
revenues. Over the period 1997-2007, goods import tariffs declined by 2.5 percentage
points on average across industries. This implies that the services to goods ratio increased
by around 45-55 percent in the average industry compared to an industry that saw no
tariff reductions at all. For comparison, the (unweighted) mean of the services-to-goods
ratio across the firms in our sample doubled from 5 percent to 10 percent between 1997and
35Note that the number of observations drops sharply when we include firm fixed effects. This is
because firms with only one year of tenure in the data and firms whose service-to-goods ratio does not
change over time do not contribute to the Poisson likelihood function and are dropped from the data (see
Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). In the Appendix we replicate results for columns (1)-(4) for the smaller
sample used for the firm fixed effects regressions. The results are almost identical to column (1)-(4) in
Table 4, demonstrating that the change in coefficient estimates is due to the inclusion of firm fixed effects
rather than changes in sample composition.
36In contrast to goods import tariffs, results for our remaining trade barrier measures (goods export
tariffs and services import and export barriers) are less consistent across columns and are mostly in-
significant. One explanation for this is that they are much less precisely measured that import tariffs.
Export tariffs are a trade-weighted average across the import tariffs imposed by foreign countries, so that
the same measure applies to different UK firms in the same industry, irrespective of their actual export
patterns. For services, an additional problem is that services barriers are much harder to measure. In
contrast to goods trade, where tariffs provide a simple and easily quantifiable restrictiveness measure,
barriers for services include a wide range of regulatory and policy instruments.
37In unreported results (available on request) we find that the effect on total sales (goods plus services)
is close to zero and not statistically significant for most specifications, including our preferred ones with
firm fixed effects.
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2007.38
An alternative way of highlighting the importance of the predicted increase in services
production is to look at associations with other variables of interest, such as wages or
employment. In Table 7 we regress a number of firm-level variables on the service-to-
goods production ratio. The results show that a one percent increase in the service-to-
goods ratio is associated with an approximate 0.08 percent increase in firm-level total
sales, a 0.028 percent increase in wages, a 0.092 percent increase in employment and a
0.024 percent increase in labour productivity. (We do not find a statistically significant
association with firm exit probabilities.) Recall our earlier prediction that the service-to-
goods ratio increased by around 50 percent in an industry with average tariff reductions
compared to an industry without tariff reductions. We can use this figure together with
the above correlations to compute implied changes in relative firm-level outcomes. For
example, according to our estimates, the 50 percent relative increase in the service ratio
linked to tariff reductions is associated with a 50 × 0.09 = 4.58 percent increase in
firm-level employment in the average industry compared to an industry without tariff
reductions. The last row of Table 7 reports similar implied changes for the other variables
as well. Of course, we caution that these calculations are based on simple correlations
and that no causal link is implied.
Robustness Checks
Estimation Method and Functional Form
We first look at the importance of functional forms, data construction and estimation
method on our results. In Table 8 the dependent variable is the service intensity of
the firm – i.e., the share of services in total (services plus goods) output, rather than
simply the ratio of the two output types. While the coefficient magnitudes are not
directly comparable to Table 4, we see that the estimates are qualitatively similar and
the coefficient on goods tariffs continues to be negative and statistically significant at the
one percent level. In Table 9 we estimate our baseline specification via OLS. Note that the
functional form is again different from the baseline – we cannot take logs of the dependent
variable because of the presence of zeros and instead regress the ratio of services to goods
revenues on the same regressors as before.39 While OLS is likely to be biased for the
reasons discussed above, it is reassuring to see that the results are qualitatively similar:
increased trade liberalization is associated with a rise in the relative provision of services.
38Note that these figures are not directly comparable to Figure 1 because they are not size-weighted,
are based on a slightly different sample, and the denominator is different (goods revenues in this section,
total revenues in Figure 1).
39Our earlier PPML estimates assume an exponential conditional mean function, i.e., E (y) = exp (Xβ)
so that β estimates a semi-elasticity.
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Note that for conciseness, we focus on our two preferred specifications here and for each
of the following robustness checks (firm fixed effects and firm fixed effects and industry
trends, respectively; i.e., those corresponding to columns 6 and 7 from Table 4).
Import Penetration Ratios
Table 10 presents results using sectoral import penetration ratios instead of goods tariffs
as our main regressor of interest. As we have argued above, import penetration ratios are
of lesser interest to policy makers and are more likely to suffer from endogeneity problems.
Nevertheless, it is reassuring to see that we obtain qualitatively similar results when
using this alternative measure of import competition. As seen in Table 10, higher import
penetration has a positive and significant impact on the service-to-goods ratio, with a
one percentage point increase in import penetration raising relative service production
by approximately 1.4%.
Focus on Domestic Sales
The ratio of services to goods revenues, which is the focus of the baseline specification
(1), includes exports as well as domestic sales. Export revenues from any location n will
depend on trade barriers imposed by that location on the exports of firm i (proxied by
τXjtG and τXjtS in specification (1)) but also on the barriers imposed on firms from third
markets. Unfortunately, we do not have data for such third-market trade barriers and
multi-collinearity issues would prevent their inclusion in any case. As a simple robustness
check we focus instead on domestic revenues in the construction of our dependent variable,
rather than total revenues (which also include export revenues). That is, we construct
domestic services revenues (RDOMijtS ) as total services revenues minus services exports.
Unfortunately, for our sample period the ARD only contains data on export revenues
for services but not for goods. Thus, we continue to use total goods revenues as the
denominator of our dependent variable. For comparison with our earlier results from
Table 4, we also estimate a specification with RDOMijtS as the dependent variable.
In Table 11 (columns 1-2), we regress the newly constructed revenue ratio (RDOMijtS /RijtG)
on the same variables as in our baseline specification. The results are very similar to our
baseline results from Table 4. When we use domestic services revenues as our dependent
variable in Table 11 (columns 3-4), we obtain slightly larger coefficient estimates in ab-
solute terms on our manufacturing import tariff regressor, but otherwise the pattern of
results is very similar to the one presented in Table 5. A possible explanation for these
similarities is that services exports accounted for only a relatively small fraction of total
manufacturing services revenues over our sample period (19 percent on average).
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Different Samples of the Data
As noted in Section 2 the ARD dataset consists of the universe of large firms and a sample
of small and medium sized firms (those with fewer than 100 or 250 employees depending
on the year). As a result, some firms are in our dataset for only a brief period (often only
a single year) while others are in the dataset in all years (large firms who entered prior to
our period and did not exit during it). In this subsection we simply repeat our baseline
specification (equation (1), estimates reported in Table 4) but estimate the regressions
across a sample of firms with at least six years tenure in our dataset, and then across a
sample of firms with at most five years tenure.40 We relegate these results to the Online
Appendix (Table A4) but note that the estimates are virtually unchanged compared to
the baseline results on the full sample. We conclude that there is nothing in particular
about our sample of firms that is driving the results.
Goods Tariffs - Trade Impact and Exogeneity
We now discuss two issues related to our use of goods import tariffs as our main regressor.
First, a necessary condition for all the mechanisms we discuss in Section 3 is that import
tariff reductions increased import competition. A simple regression of imports and import
penetration ratios on goods import tariffs confirms that goods tariff reductions did indeed
lead to significant increases in imports and import penetration ratios (see Table A5 in
the Online Appendix). Specifically, a one percentage point reduction in MFN tariffs led
to a 9.4% increase in total UK goods imports and a 4.34 percentage point increase in the
UK’s import penetration ratio.
Second, as discussed in Section 2, we believe that import tariff reductions were largely
exogenous given the institutional setting within which they were negotiated. Here, we
provide additional evidence that individual UK firms and sectors did not influence WTO
tariff negotiations in a way that is systematically related to their current outcomes (e.g.,
struggling UK firms may make efforts to maintain high tariffs). In Table 12 we present
the results of industry-level regressions in which the dependent variable is the change
in industry tariffs between 1997 and 2007 and the regressors are the industry growth
rates of average wages, employment and sales in the pre-period, 1992 to 1996. In other
words, we ask whether observed tariff variation is predicted by lagged industry outcomes.
Table 12 suggests that these variables have no predictive power. Thus, to the extent
that industry outcomes reflect the experience of the firms within those industries that
are most likely to engage in lobbying, these results suggest no relationship between the
40These tenure lengths were chosen as the mid-point of the ranges of tenures in our data (one to
eleven years). In unreported results we repeat the analysis for different tenure length cases, and these
are available on request. The results are consistently similar across samples.
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outcomes of those firms and future tariff changes. We acknowledge that some endogeneity
concerns might remain, however. If UK policy makers based their negotiating position
on expectations about the future performance of UK industries and if these expectations
influenced the EU’s negotiating position and led to changes in the outcome of multilateral
tariff negotiations in the WTO, tariffs could be correlated with other contemporaneous
forces that also shape the transition of manufacturing from goods to services.
Attrition and the Role of Firm Exit
The main determinant of firms’ disappearance from our dataset is the sampling design of
the ARD, which only surveys a randomly chosen sample of smaller firms in a given year.
By construction, this form of sample attrition is random and will not be related to trade
liberalization. However, firms will also drop out of the sample if they go bankrupt and
exit the market. This could potentially explain our results if firms that produce relatively
little service output (i.e., are primarily, or solely, goods producers) are driven out of the
market due to trade liberalization. In this sense the results may, in part, reflect a change
in the composition of firms in the market rather than simply an on-average within-firm
shift toward services. In Table 13 we report the results of a standard attrition probability
regression in which the dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether a firm exits
the sample due to closure at some point during the period 1997-2007.41 The regressors are
the average annual change in import tariffs faced by the firm over the firm’s tenure (which
could be fewer than the maximum 11 years), the firm’s initial goods-to-services ratio, and
the interaction between tariffs and the initial ratio. We see in Table 13 that goods import
tariffs are negatively related to exit probabilities although that effect is not statistically
significant (column 1).42 More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term is also
close to zero and is insignificant, indicating that differential attrition is unlikely to explain
our results. In columns 2-3, we also interact the three other trade barriers measures with
initial goods-to-services ratio, again finding no evidence for differential attrition.
41We use the Business Structure Database (BSD) to construct this exit indicator. The BSD is con-
structed from snapshots of the U.K.’s business registry and essentially contains the universe of incorpo-
rated firms. Given that the ARD sample is drawn from the BSD, we can link the exit indicator to our
regression sample. The indicator takes the value of one if employment reported in the BSD drops to zero
or if the firm disappears from the BSD at some point during the period 97-07.
42At first sight, this seems to contradict previous findings in the literature that trade liberalization
increases exit probabilities. We note, however, that our estimate is close to statistical significance (p-
value of 0.2) and is of economically significant magnitude (a one percentage point reduction in import
tariffs increases the likelihood of exit by around 4-5 percentage points). One explanation of the lack of
statistical significance might be measurement error in the dependent variable (the exit indicator). As
discussed by Criscuolo, Haskel and Martin (2003), the underlying firm registry data (the BSD) does not
continuously update employment information for many of the smaller firms so that firms that exit are
sometimes still listed as having positive employment.
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The Role of Offshoring
Next, we consider evidence for one of the mechanisms discussed in Section 3 – offshoring.
It is possible that the pattern observed in the regression results above may be due to
an increase in geographic specialization on the part of multinationals. In other words,
in response to lower manufacturing import tariffs UK firms may simply be moving their
goods production overseas – i.e., offshoring goods production – while increasing their focus
on the provision of headquarters services. Relatedly, Bernard and Fort (2013) note the
prevalence of factoryless manufacturing firms in the US, which they find primarily consist
of firms that focus their activities on goods design while also coordinating the manufacture
and assembly of products in (often) overseas locations. It is therefore possible that we
are simply observing a trend toward more factoryless firms in the UK. It is important to
note that these two phenomena may be distinct: whereas offshoring typically denotes the
movement of intermediates production to overseas locations, factoryless firms are typically
importing final goods from overseas. We therefore take two approaches in our exploration
of this issue, described below. We also note that the possibility of either phenomena
occurring does not undermine the goal of the paper, which is simply to estimate the
relationship between goods trade liberalization and increased services provision on the
part of UK firms, independent of the firm’s motivations for the transition. It does,
however, potentially add nuance to the story, as it addresses whether firms are simply
ceasing goods production in the face of competition, or are relocating goods production.
First, we can directly test for increased provision of headquarter services by simply
repeating regression (1) but, rather than using domestic services revenues as the depen-
dent variable, we instead use the value of firms’ exports of services to affiliated foreign
entreprises. This value is independently recorded as a unique service type within the ITIS
dataset, and should be associated with increasing production fragmentation within the
firm. That is, if firms do indeed respond to goods trade liberalization by focusing their
domestic activities on the provision of headquarters services, we should observe a positive
correlation between import tariff reductions and services exports to affiliated entreprises
(our proxy for headquarters service provision)43 Table 14 shows that there is no evidence
for this hypothesis – goods tariff reductions actually seem to reduce exports of affiliate
services although the coefficient is not statistically significant.44
43We construct exports of affiliate services by matching our regression sample (which is from the
ARD) to the International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS). If a firm cannot be matched and reports
zero services exports or zero services production in the ARD, we set affiliate exports for that firm to zero.
There are also a few firms which report positive services exports in the ARD but cannot be matched to
the ITIS; we drop these from our sample. (Results are similar if we set affiliate services exports for such
firms to zero instead of dropping them.)
44In unreported results, we also estimated our most basic specification which only includes year fixed
effects and the two import barrier variables (similar to column 1 of Table 4). Here, the coefficient
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As a further test of the specific role of offshoring (i.e., trade in intermediates) we add
controls for intermediate input tariffs in our estimation of equation 1. (See Section 2
for a description of the construction of these tariffs.) Intuitively, if UK manufacturing
firms offshore manufacturing input production and re-import intermediate inputs, the
shift out of domestic goods production and into services should be made easier by lower
tariffs on intermediates because this reduces the cost of importing intermediates. Results
are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 14, where we find that the main results
are virtually unchanged when these controls are included. Furthermore, the coefficient
on intermediate input tariffs is negative as expected but statistically insignificant.45 We
conclude that a shift toward increased relative provision of headquarters services in re-
sponse to trade liberalization is unlikely to have played a major role over our sample
period.46
Determinants of Firms’ Response to Trade Liberalization
We next estimate specification (2) in which relative firm-level service-to-goods revenues
are still the dependent variable but goods import tariffs are now interacted with additional
regressors – i.e., we allow for firm heterogeneity in the response to trade liberalization.
As discussed, the aim of this exercise is to provide evidence for or against the mechanisms
discussion in Section 3. Table 15 reports the results. Column (1) includes interaction
terms between goods import tariffs and initial R&D stocks (normalized by firm sales),
initial physical capital stocks (also normalized by firm sales), and the initial firm average
wage, respectively.47 In column (2), we use labor productivity instead of wages as a proxy
on manufacturing import tariffs was indeed negative and significant, although its magnitude was only
around one fourth of the effect of import tariffs on total services sales. Once we include additional
control variables and more restrictive sets of fixed effects, however, the import tariff regressor becomes
insignificant.
45One explanation for this negative finding is that reduced intermediate input tariffs also have the
additional effect of making intermediates imported from outside the firm’s boundaries cheaper, hence
lowering production cost. If this cost-reducing effect is stronger for goods than service production, lower
input tariffs will induce a relative shift toward good production, partially offsetting the offshoring effect
just discussed. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to further quantify the relative importance of
these two channels.
46In unreported results, we also implemented a version of the approach taken by Autor, et al (2014). In
short, we explored the UK industry-level impact of Chinese import penetration, where we instrumented
for Chinese import penetration with import penetration in non-UK high-income countries over our period,
1997-2007. We find results consistent with those reported here – i.e., relatively greater Chinese import
penetration is associated with a relatively larger shift toward services across UK industries. These results
are available upon request.
47We note that when we include R&D stocks our sample shifts toward R&D-intensive firms due to
the fact that our source for the R&D information, the BERD, samples firms that are relatively likely to
engage in R&D.
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for the skill-intensity of production and in column (3) we include both.48 In column (4),
we further control for the initial share of services in total sales to account for the possibility
that firms with higher initial service production might find the shift into services easier.
Finally, column (5) adds 2-digit industry time trends.
Firstly, the results indicate a role for R&D in promoting the firm’s response to trade
liberalization. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically signifi-
cant throughout and is not much affected by the inclusion of additional control variables.
Firms with higher initial R&D stocks thus see a stronger shift into services relative to
goods revenues as manufacturing import tariffs fall. At the same time, we find little im-
pact on the transition to services from any of the other variables. A higher initial capital
intensity is associated with a less pronounced transition but the effect is not statistically
significant at conventional levels. In addition, if we take the initial average wage as a
proxy for initial skill, it is clear that the most low-skill intensive firms are not necessar-
ily the most responsive to the liberalization episode. This points away from the simple
Heckscher-Ohlin channel discussed in Section 3. Having also ruled out the offshoring
channel above, the evidence suggests a prominent role for the knowledge-intensity of the
firm, as proxied by the R&D stock, in driving the shift toward increased relative services
provision in the face of trade liberalization.
It therefore seems that trade liberalization in the goods market leads firms to shift
toward increased provision of services in the face of falling import barriers, and that the
most expertise-intensive firms are the most responsive. This evidence seems to favor a
mechanism by which accumulated expertise allows firms to shift into increased service
provision. We note, however, that it is also consistent with a more nuanced Heckscher-
Ohlin mechanism in which R&D intensity itself is a source of comparative advantage.49
6 Concluding Remarks
In the face of trade liberalization domestic firms are often forced out of the market,
whereas others adapt and survive. In this paper we have focused on a new channel
of adaptation, namely the shift toward increased provision of services in lieu of goods
production. Using firm-level data for the UK over the period 1997-2007, we have explored
the link between lower manufacturing import tariffs and the firm’s tradeoff between goods
production and the provision of services, finding that lower import tariffs on goods caused
48As discussed previously, labor productivity might also play a role if the transition into services
production requires a fixed cost investment. This investment would only be profitable for more productive
firms and we should observe a stronger shift into services for such firms in response to the tariff reductions.
49In addition, to the extent that our proxy for skill is imprecise, our R&D variable may also be picking
up additional variation in skill across firms.
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firms to shift into services provision, and out of goods production. The magnitude of our
results is highly significant, both statistically and economically.50
We also examined the factors influencing the extent of the transition into services. We
found that a firm’s initial stock of R&D is strongly associated with a successful transition,
while the average skill level of the firm (as proxied by average wages), its productivity,
its capital stock and initial level of service production play little direct role. While
we interpret this as evidence that a firm’s accumulated expertise may be a key asset
in surviving import competition, we note that this does not rule out a more nuanced
Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism in which R&D intensity itself is a source of comparative
advantage.
50As a comparison to somewhat related work, Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro and Vichyanond (2013) explore
the response of multi-product firms to exchange rate shocks, finding a large response in terms of the
number of products added in the face of an exchange rate depreciation.
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7 Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Share of Services in UK Manufacturing (1997-2007)
Notes: Figure shows the ratio of services revenues to total revenues in the UK manufacturing sector over the period 1997
to 2007. See Section 2 for details on the underlying data.
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Figure 2: Average Annual Within-Firm Growth in Goods versus Services
Notes: Figure plots the average annual log change in Goods production versus Services provision within firms in the UK
manufacturing sector over the period 1997-2007. See Section 2 for details on the underlying data.
Table 1: Services Types Exported by UK Manufacturing Firms
Enterprise-Years
Service Type Fraction Number
Royalties and Licenses 38% 1890
Technical Services 36% 1787
Agricultural, Mining, On-Site Processing Services 20% 986
Business and Professional Services 18% 890
Communications Services 11% 542
Computer and Information Services 8% 382
Merchanting and Other Trade-Related Services 8% 378
Other Trade in Services 3% 169
Personal, Cultural and Recreational Services 2% 86
Construction Services 2% 79
Insurance Services 1% 25
Notes: The table presents the fraction and number of firm-years for which we observe exports of
each services category. Fractions are calculated relative to the total number of firm-year obser-
vations in our regression sample which can be matched to the ITIS (4,932 observations in total).
Firms can export more than one service in a given year, so that percentages add up to more than
100 percent. See Section 2 for details on the underlying data.
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Table 2: Firm Entry and Exit
Entrants Exiters Stayers
Year Firms Count Fraction Count Fraction Count Fraction
1997 11086 11086 100% 5453 49% – –
1998 11386 5753 51% 5621 49% 3737 33%
1999 11161 5396 48% 5568 50% 3164 28%
2000 10974 5381 49% 5482 50% 3196 29%
2001 11457 5965 52% 5812 51% 3082 27%
2002 10541 4896 46% 5226 50% 3280 31%
2003 10307 4992 48% 5013 49% 3151 31%
2004 10020 4726 47% 5064 51% 3019 30%
2005 9417 4461 47% 5035 53% 2596 28%
2006 8587 4205 49% 4171 49% 2602 30%
2007 9448 5032 53% 9448 100% – –
Notes: The total number of firms in the full data are reported along with their
persistence in the sample. Entrants are firms that were not in the sample in the prior
period but are in the sample in the current period. Exiters are firms that are in
the sample in the current period but are not in the sample in the following period.
Stayers are firms that are in the sample in the prior, current and following period.
The fraction is the percentage of total firms in each category – a firm only present
in the current period will be both an exiter and an entrant so our fractions need not
sum to 100 percent.
Table 3: Change in Services Share and Beginning-of-Period Firm-Level Covariates
∆ Ratio of Services/Goods Revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Initial avg. wage) 0.00093∗∗∗ −0.00175
(0.00050) (0.00142)
log(Initial R&D) 0.00091∗∗∗ 0.00099∗∗∗
(0.00027) (0.00031)
log(Initial capital stock) −0.00013 −0.00051
(0.00016) (0.00036)
log(Initial total revenue) 0.00042∗∗∗ 0.00014
(0.00012) (0.00041)
Observations 60880 15346 64160 64160 14644
Firms 22430 5007 23166 23166 4895
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Notes: Table presents results for regressions of the annual percentage-point change in the share of
services in total revenue (denoted ∆ Ratio of Services/Goods Revenue) on the firm-level variables
listed in the first column. Firm-level variables are measured at the beginning of the period over which
the change in the dependent variable is calculated. See Section 2 for details on the underlying data.
Standard errors clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses, where * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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Table 4: Baseline Results
Ratio of Service/Goods Revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Goods import tariffs −0.916∗∗∗ −0.893∗∗∗ −0.859∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.329) (0.328) (0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.066)
Goods export tariffs −0.148 −0.147 0.010 −0.038 −0.052 −0.051
(0.132) (0.125) (0.139) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047)
Services export barriers 0.129 0.140 2.701∗∗∗ 0.015 0.040 0.119
(0.142) (0.134) (1.274) (0.090) (0.086) (0.092)
Services import barriers 0.945 1.115∗ 0.971∗ 4.207 −0.625 −0.210 −0.835
(0.611) (0.597) (0.577) (4.469) (1.118) (1.047) (1.248)
log(Labor productivity) 0.114 −0.005 −0.275 −0.272
(0.239) (0.204) (0.228) (0.227)
log(Average wage) 0.146∗∗∗ −0.017 0.957∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.094) (0.359) (0.359)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No Yes No No No
Firm FEs No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No No No No No Yes
Observations 109598 107073 97502 97502 60416 54905 54905
Number of Firms 46164 45232 40948 40948 15525 14284 14284
Notes: PPML regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues from services and revenues from goods on industry tariffs,
the log of firm productivity, and the log average wage. FEs indicate fixed effects in the model. Time trends are
2-digit UK SIC industry time trends. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International
Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS). Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses, where
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 5: Services Revenues as Dependent Variable
Services revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Goods import tariffs −0.597∗∗∗ −0.478∗∗ −0.319∗ −0.013 −0.025∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.026∗∗
(0.227) (0.212) (0.167) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Goods export tariffs −0.275 −0.154 0.015 −0.116∗∗ −0.093∗∗ −0.095∗∗
(0.253) (0.123) (0.071) (0.048) (0.046) (0.047)
Services export barriers −0.720 −0.160 0.082 0.133 0.113 0.133
(1.513) (0.429) (0.095) (0.099) (0.082) (0.082)
Services import barriers 2.526∗∗∗ 2.598∗∗ 2.551∗∗∗ 4.281∗∗∗ 0.499 0.632 0.711
(0.823) (1.009) (0.742) (1.323) (0.597) (0.426) (0.450)
log(Labor productivity) 0.429∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.193) (0.070) (0.069)
log(Average wage) 1.177∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.039) (0.137) (0.135)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No Yes No No No
Firm FEs No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No No No No No Yes
Observations 114006 111436 101383 101383 58192 56782 56782
Number of Firms 47919 46937 42480 42480 15939 14709 14709
Notes: PPML regressions of the firm’s revenues from services on industry tariffs, the log of firm productivity, and
the log average wage. FEs indicate fixed effects in the model. Time trends are 2-digit UK SIC industry time
trends. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry
(ITIS). Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses, where * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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Table 6: Goods Revenues as Dependent Variable
Goods revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Goods import tariffs 0.059∗∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.007 0.004∗∗ 0.000 0.000 −0.002
(0.012) (0.014) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Goods export tariffs 0.079∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.011 −0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.091) (0.005) (0.006)
Services export barriers −0.006 0.011 −0.033∗ −0.022 −0.023 −0.025∗
(0.062) (0.042) (0.019) (0.051) (0.015) (0.014)
Services import barriers 0.373∗ 0.322 0.105 0.015 0.141∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.099∗∗
(0.221) (0.228) (0.104) (0.233) (0.053) (0.045) (0.046)
log(Labor productivity) 0.316∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.045) (0.026) (0.023)
log(Average wage) 0.978∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.015) (0.031) (0.031)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No Yes No No No
Firm FEs No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No No No No No Yes
Observations 113127 110557 100608 100608 81277 78983 78983
Number of Firms 47594 46648 42199 42199 23024 21128 21128
Notes: PPML regressions of the firm’s revenues from goods on industry tariffs, the log of firm productivity, and
the log average wage. FEs indicate fixed effects in the model. Time trends are 2-digit UK SIC industry time
trends. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry
(ITIS). Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses, where * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
Table 7: Relating Services Relative to Goods Sales with Firm Outcomes
Total Average Employment Labor 5-year
Sales Wage ARD Productivity Exit Rate
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(Ratio Service/Goods production) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.029) (0.003) (0.023) (0.004) (0.003)
Predicted Effect of a 1% Tariff Reduction 3.99% 1.38% 4.61% 1.20% 0.00%
Observations 48638 43324 43533 43533 48638
Notes: Year and firm fixed effects included. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD).
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses, where * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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Table 8: Baseline Robustness – Ratio of Service to Total Revenue
Ratio of Service/
(Goods + Service) Revenue
Variables (1) (2)
Goods import tariffs −0.028∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Goods export tariffs −0.036∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗
(0.013) (0.014)
Services export barriers −0.003 0.030
(0.044) (0.041)
Services import barriers 0.381 0.356
(0.254) (0.255)
log(Labor productivity) −0.019 −0.022
(0.041) (0.040)
log(Average wage) −0.128∗ −0.123∗
(0.071) (0.069)
Year FEs Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No
Firm FEs Yes Yes
Time Trends No Yes
Observations 55590 55590
Number of firms 14466 14466
Notes: PPML regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues from
services and revenues from goods on industry tariffs, the log
of firm productivity, and the log average wage. FEs indicate
fixed effects in the model. Time trends are 2-digit UK SIC
industry time trends. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents
Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry
(ITIS). Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and
are in parentheses, where * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 9: Baseline Robustness – OLS
Ratio of Service/Goods Revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Goods import tariffs −0.027∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.012∗ −0.013∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Goods export tariffs −0.019 −0.019 0.007 −0.005 −0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.007) (0.014)
Services export barriers 0.003 0.004 0.065 0.001 0.001
(0.023) (0.023) (0.083) (0.002) (0.033)
Services import barriers 0.107∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.446 0.027 0.020
(0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.354) (0.031) (0.104)
log(Labor productivity) 0.020 0.004 −0.019 −0.019
(0.021) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025)
log(Average wage) 0.022 −0.002 0.064 0.064
(0.009) (0.010) (0.034) (0.036)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No Yes No No
Firm FEs No No No No Yes Yes
Time Trends No No No No No Yes
Observations 109598 107073 97502 97502 79160 79160
Number of Firms 46164 45232 40948 24578 22606 22606
Notes: OLS regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues from services and revenues from goods on
industry tariffs, the log of firm productivity, and the log average wage. FEs indicate fixed effects in the
model. Time trends are 2-digit UK SIC industry time trends. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents
Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS). Standard errors are clustered at
the industry level and are in parentheses, where * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 10: Baseline Robustness – Import Penetration
Ratio of Service/Goods Revenue
Variables (1) (2)
Import Penetration 1.429∗∗ 1.431∗∗
(0.724) (0.724)
Goods export tariffs −0.148∗∗ −0.149∗∗
(0.064) (0.064)
Services export barriers 0.006 0.005
(0.237) (0.237)
Services import barriers −0.419 −0.424
(0.673) (0.675)
Log(Labor productivity) −0.406 −0.406
(0.306) (0.306)
Log(Wage) 0.842∗∗ 0.842∗∗
(0.356) (0.356)
Year FEs Yes No
Industry FEs No No
Firm FEs Yes No
Time Trends No Yes
Observations 31573 31573
Number of firms 8213 8213
Notes: PPML regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues
from services and revenues from goods on goods import
penetration, industry tariffs, the log of firm productivity,
and the log average wage. FEs indicate fixed effects in
the model. Time trends are 2-digit UK SIC industry time
trends. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database
(ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS).
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are
in parentheses, where * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 11: Using Domestic Services Revenues in the Construction of the Revenue Ratio
Ratio of Service/Goods Revenue Domestic Services Revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Goods import tariffs −0.248∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.079) (0.027) (0.025)
Goods export tariffs −0.129 −0.126 −0.092 −0.092
(0.080) (0.081) (0.061) (0.065)
Services export barriers 0.113 0.167 −0.028 −0.006
(0.233) (0.169) (0.168) (0.166)
Services import barriers −0.349 −0.889 −0.111 −0.218
(0.798) (0.807) (0.398) (0.534)
log(Labor productivity) −0.172 −0.171 0.016 0.016
(0.231) (0.231) (0.123) (0.122)
log(Average wage) 0.981∗∗ 0.992∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗ 0.308∗∗
(0.382) (0.383) (0.128) (0.133)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No No
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Observations 44883 44883 46303 46303
Number of firms 11132 11132 11425 11425
Notes: PPML regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues from domestic services and revenues from goods
on industry tariffs, the log of firm productivity, and the log average wage. FEs indicate fixed effects in the
model. Time trends are 2-digit UK SIC industry time trends. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents
Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS). Standard errors are clustered at the
industry level and are in parentheses, where * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 12: Tariffs and Industry Characteristics
∆Goods Import Tariffs
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Average wage −0.021 −0.017
(0.024) (0.024)
∆Employment 0.000 0.008
(0.004) (0.007)
∆Sales −0.004 −0.009
(0.004) (0.006)
Constant −0.533∗∗∗ −0.520∗∗∗ −0.518∗∗∗ −0.526∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
Observations 225 225 225 225
R-squared 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.014
Notes: Industry-level regressions in which the dependent variable (∆ Goods
Import Tariffs) is the change in industry tariffs between 1997 and 2007 and the
regressors are the industry growth rates of average wages, employment and sales
in the pre-period, 1992 to 1996.
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Table 13: Firm Attrition and Tariffs
Exiter = 1
Variables (1) (2) (3)
∆Goods import tariffs −0.039 −0.045 −0.048
(0.035) (0.036) (0.039)
Initial Service/Goods revenue −0.002 −0.015 −0.030
(0.004) (0.019) (0.030)
∆Goods import tariff * Initial Service/Goods revenue −0.005 −0.013 −0.019
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029)
∆Services import barriers −0.193∗∗ −0.219∗∗
(0.086) (0.090)
∆Services import barriers * Initial Service/Goods revenue −0.131 −0.224
(0.203) (0.300)
∆Goods export tariffs 0.016
(0.045)
∆Goods export tariff * Initial Service/Goods revenue −0.028
(0.027)
∆Services export barriers −0.002
(0.001)
∆Services export barriers * Initial Service/Goods revenue 0.003
(0.008)
Observations 40732 40317 38827
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.002
Notes: Dependent variable (Exiter = 1) is 1 if the firm exits the BSD (employment falls to zero) at some point
during the period 1997 to 2007. The firm can enter at any point. Independent change variables (denoted
∆) are average annual changes over the lifetime of the firm (could be fewer than 11 years). Standard errors
are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses, where * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 14: Exports of Headquarters Services and Intermediate Inputs
Exported HQ Services Ratio of Service/
Goods Revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Goods import tariffs 0.065 0.075 −0.211∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.047) (0.064) (0.066)
Goods input tariffs −0.107 −0.152
(0.153) (0.164)
Goods export tariffs 0.174 0.269∗ −0.053 −0.053
(0.171) (0.151) (0.047) (0.047)
Services export barriers −2.319 −2.351 0.0382 0.123
(3.248) (3.502) (0.087) (0.094)
Services import barriers −0.718 −0.454 −0.187 −0.845
(1.070) (1.007) (1.028) (1.244)
Log(Labor productivity) −0.437∗∗∗ −0.412∗∗ −0.277 −0.274
(0.156) (0.161) (0.227) (0.226)
Log(Average wage) −0.806∗∗ −0.791∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗
(0.346) (0.346) (0.359) (0.359)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No No
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Observations 2020 2020 54905 54905
Number of Firms 339 339 14284 14284
Notes: PPML regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues from services and revenues
from goods on industry tariffs, the log of firm productivity, and the log average wage.
The sharp drop in the number of observations is due to the fact that firms that never
export headquarter services are dropped from the sample as they do not contribute
to the fixed-effect Poisson likelihood function (also see footnote 33). FEs indicate fixed
effects in the model. Time trends are 2-digit UK SIC industry time trends. Data Source:
ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry
(ITIS). Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses, where
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 15: Interaction Regressions and Beginning-of-Period Firm-Level Covariates
Ratio of Service/Goods Revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Goods import tariffs −0.139 −0.198 −0.178 −0.184 −0.148
(0.244) (0.307) (0.317) (0.341) (0.348)
Goods export tariffs −0.080 −0.082 −0.081 −0.081 −0.077
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059)
Services export barriers 0.129 0.128 0.128 0.129 0.141
(0.156) (0.157) (0.156) (0.157) (0.157)
Services import barriers 1.242 1.253 1.240 1.228 0.963
(0.792) (0.795) (0.792) (0.764) (0.744)
Goods import tariff * Initial R&D −0.110∗ −0.114∗∗ −0.111∗ −0.112∗ −0.102∗
(0.057) (0.056) (0.058) (0.060) (0.058)
Goods import tariff * Initial Capital investment 0.072 0.074 0.072 0.073 0.066
(0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051)
Goods import tariff * log(Initial Labor productivity) 0.039 0.028 0.027 0.020
(0.035) (0.055) (0.056) (0.053)
Goods import tariff * log(Initial Average wage) 0.063 0.025 0.028 0.027
(0.064) (0.110) (0.117) (0.115)
Goods import tariff * Initial Service revenue −0.010 −0.009
(0.081) (0.079)
log(Average wage) 0.311 0.297 0.305 0.303 0.293
(0.394) (0.386) (0.392) (0.387) (0.384)
log(Labor productivity) 0.578∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.172) (0.176) (0.172) (0.172)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No No No
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No No No Yes
Observations 7151 7151 7151 7151 7151
Number of Firms 1322 1322 1322 1322 1322
Notes: PPML regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues from services and revenues from goods on industry tariffs,
the log of firm productivity, and the log average wage. Time trends are 2-digit UK SIC industry time trends. Data
Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS). Standard
errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses, where * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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